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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a claim by Appellant Silicon International Ore, LLC ("SIO") that it 
was entitled to purchase silica sand in perpetuity from a quartzite mine owned by Respondent 
Monsanto Company ("Monsanto"). When it was denied access to this silica sand, SIO sought 
damages through this litigation. 
As against Monsanto, SIO claimed entitlement to this alleged perpetual right to purchase 
silica sand based on a number of alternative theories. 1 First, SIO alleged that Monsanto verbally 
agreed to this perpetual arrangement.2 Alternatively, SIO alleged that Monsanto was estopped 
from denying it access to the silica sand based upon equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel. 
Monsanto filed for summary judgment, arguing that no verbal agreement was ever 
reached between the parties and that any verbal agreement was unenforceable because it violated 
the statute of frauds set forth in LC. § 28-2-201(1) and because its essential terms were vague, 
indefinite and uncertain. Monsanto also argued that SI O's causes of action for equitable estoppel 
or quasi-estoppel should be dismissed. 
After the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Monsanto, SIO appealed. 
1 In this litigation, SIO also asserted claims against Respondent Washington Group International, 
Inc. Those claims will not be addressed in this brief. 
2 Throughout the Appellant's Opening Brief, SIO refers to this as "the contract" without properly 
clarifying that it was alleged to be only a "verbal" agreement. 
5 
II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. Operation of Quartzite Mine by WGI under First Quartzite Agreement 
Monsanto through its wholly owned subsidiary P4 Production owns a quartzite mine near 
Soda Springs, Idaho.3 Since 1988, Monsanto has contracted with Respondent Washington 
Group International, Inc. ("WGI") to operate this quartzite mine.4 WGI operated the quartzite 
mine under a Quartzite Agreement executed between it and Monsanto (hereinafter "First 
Quartzite Agreement"). 5 
Quartzite is commonly known as silica.6 WGI's operation of this quartzite mme 
generated silica that was too small to be used in Monsanto's ma.'1ufacturing process. 7 This 
byproduct is commonly referred to as silica sand. 8 
B. Written Contracts for Sale of Processed Silica Sand to SIO 
In early 2000, SIO contacted Monsanto expressing an interest in acquiring silica sand.9 
Monsanto and WGI jointly met with SIO to discuss SIO's proposal and business plan to market 
silica sand for use in such things as playgrounds, golf courses, asphalt, grout and stucco. 10 
3 R. Vol. 2, pp. 138, 145. 
4 Id. at pp. 138, 145-202. Note that the record contains a Quartzite Agreement executed in 1993 
between Monsanto and WGI (fka Conda Mining Inc.). Id. at pp. 139, 145. The first page of this 
1993 Quartzite Agreement indicates that WGI had been operating the quartzite mine since 1988. 
Id. at p. 145. 
5 Id. at pp. 145-202. Please note that this was not the "First" Quartzite Agreement between 
Monsanto and WGL See footnote 4. The term "First" is used in this brief with regard to this 
Quartzite Agreement merely for purposes of contrasting it with a subsequent Quartzite 
Agreement discussed later in this brief. 
6 Id. at p. 138. 
7 Id. at pp. 138-39. 
s Id. 
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On May 3, 2000, after initial discussions and completion of feasibility studies, SIO 
delivered a proposed contract to Monsanto. 11 The proposed contract was drafted by SI0. 12 The 
terms of the proposed contract required (1) that SIO would purchase the silica sand directly from 
Monsanto; (2) that Monsanto would at its expense provide SIO with a building and the land 
necessary to process the silica sand; (3) that SIO would purchase a minimum of 500 tons of silica 
sand in the first year and more in the following years; and ( 4) that the agreement would remain 
effective for twenty (20) years. 13 
Monsanto did not execute SIO's proposed contract. 14 Although it was amenable to 
making silica sand available to SIO, Monsanto was not interested in doing so under the proposed 
terms. Among other terms Monsanto would not accept, Monsanto was not interested in selling 
the silica sand directly to SIO which would effectively bypass WGI, who at that time had been 
operating the quartzite mine for over twelve (12) years. 15 
Therefore, it was decided that SIO should contract directly with WGI instead of 
Monsanto to acquire the silica sand. 16 This required the execution of an addendum to the First 
9 Id. at p. 140. 
10 Id. at pp. 140, 197. 
11 Id. at pp. 140, 236-38. The proposed contract identified "Solutia Inc." as the seller of the silica 
sand. Monsanto was operating the quartzite mine under that name at that time. Id. 
12 Id. at p. 140. 
13 Id. at pp. 140, 236-38. 
14 Id. at p. 140. 
is Id. 
16 Id. at pp. 140, 240. 
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Quartzite Agreement between Monsanto and WGI, the execution of a contract between WGI and 
SIO, and the execution of a Confidentiality Agreement. 
On November 29, 2000, Monsanto and WGI executed an Addendum to Quartzite 
Agreement (hereinafter "First Addendum") pursuant to which (1) WGI was authorized to 
construct and operate a silica sand processing facility at the quartzite mine to be used to process 
and bag silica sand; and (2) WGI was required to pay Monsanto $13.00 per ton of "finished" 
silica sand "sold by [WGI] to a third party."17 The addendum provided that WGI "anticipate[d] 
entering into one or more contracts with [SIO] related to ... the sale of the processed silica 
sand."18 
Two days later on December 1, 2000, SIO and WGI executed a Master Agreement 
pursuant to which (1) WGI agreed to provide "a portion of the silica sand within its control" to 
SIO; (2) SIO agreed to pay for the construction of a processing plant for the silica sand; (3) SIO 
agreed to also pay WGI to operate the processing plant to dry, screen, and bag the silica sand; (4) 
SIO agreed to also pay WGI an additional $13.00 per ton for the processed silica sand; and (5) 
WGI agreed to load the bagged silica sand onto trucks provided by SI0. 19 Pursuant to paragraph 
7 of the Master Agreement, title to the silica sand passed to SIO upon delivery of the silica sand 
by WGI.2° Lastly, by its own terms, the Master Agreement was effective for a period of only 
17 Id. at pp. 174-75. 
18 Id. at p. 175. 
19 Id. at pp. 204-13. 
20 Id. at p. 206. 
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five (5) years, unless otherwise agreed in writing by the parties.21 Because the Master 
Agreement contemplated the transfer of title to the silica sand for a price, it clearly contemplated 
that WGI would be selling processed silica sand to SI0.22 
On December 19, 2000, Monsanto and SIO executed a Confidentiality Agreement 
wherein they both agreed to keep confidential all information obtained from the other concerning 
their respective business operations.23 
On this same day, December 19, 2000, Robert Sullivan, who had signed the Master 
Agreement on behalf of SI0,24 sent a letter to Monsanto in which he expressed his satisfaction 
with the Master Agreement and stated, "we are pleased that the intent seems to be a long-term 
relationship."25 Whatever Mr. Sullivan may have intended by this statement, the Master 
Agreement, which he had signed only eighteen (18) days previously, clearly provided that the 
relationship was for only a five-year period. As a matter of law, Mr. Sullivan's letter did not 
extend the Master Agreement beyond that five-year period. 
21 Id. at p. 207. It is undisputed that the parties never agreed in writing to extend this five-year 
period. 
22 Id. at p. 206. SIO's contention that the Master Agreement did not provide for the "sale" of 
silica sand is erroneous. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 7. Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code defines a "sale" as "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a 
price." I.C. § 28-2-106(1 ). This is exactly what the terms of the Master Agreement provided. 
23 Id. at pp. 216-216 (Note that the Confidentiality Agreement consists of two pages. Both pages 
are labeled by the record clerk as page "216"). 
24 Id. at p. 210. 
r ) R. Vol. 3, p. 449. 
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C. Execution of the Second Quartzite Agreement and Second Addendum 
The First Quartzite Agreement was by its terms to expire at the end of 2002.26 Monsanto 
and WGI decided to renew their First Quartzite Agreement prior to its expiration. Accordingly, 
on September 24, 2001, Monsanto and WGI executed a new Quartzite Agreement for an 
additional seven (7) year period (hereinafter "Second Quartzite Agreement").27 Pursuant to its 
terms, the Second Quartzite Agreement terminated and replaced the First Quartzite Agreement. 28 
On March 1, 2002, Monsanto and WGI executed a new Addendum to Quartzite 
Agreement (hereinafter "Second Addendum") which terminated and replaced the First 
Addendum.29 The terms of the Second Addendum were materially identical to the terms of the 
First Addendum, except that the Second Addendum provided (1) that WGI would pay Monsanto 
between $3.00 to $13.00 per ton of processed silica sand based upon particle size which was 
either "sold by SIO" or "used by [WGI] itself; and (2) that "[t]itle to the silica sand sold by SIO 
shall pass directly from [Monsanto] to SIO upon processing ... subject to payment."30 The 
Second Addendum also provided that Monsanto would with certain conditions "make available 
sufficient feed sand to allow SIO to sell up to 25,000 tons per year of product sand."31 
26 R. Vol. 2, p. 149. 
27 Id. at pp. 177-202. 
28 Id. at p. 177. 
29 Id. at pp. 194-97. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at p. 197. 
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D. SI O's Business Operation under the Master Agreement 
Sometime after executing the Master Agreement with WGI on December 1, 2000, SIO 
set up its operations in the quartzite mine.32 In conformance with the terms of the Master 
Agreement, SIO purchased processed silica sand directly from WGI and in returned tendered the 
agreed upon price per ton to WGI.33 At no time did SIO ever tender any payments directly to 
Monsanto.34 
SIO's business was commercially unsuccessful. Its own records reveal that it failed to 
make any profit during any year of its operation.35 SIO's yearly operating loss was between 
($97,598) and ($132,525).36 
Although the Master Agreement between WGI and SIO expired by its terms on 
December 1, 2005, WGI continued selling processed silica sand to SIO for an additional two 
years.37 However, by letter dated December 28, 2007, WGI notified SIO that it would no longer 
be providing processed silica sand to SIO after the year end.38 
32 Id. at p. 140; R. Vol. 3, p. 360. 
33 R. Vol. 2, pp. 140-41. 
'4 _; Id. at p. 141. 
35 R. Vol. 3, pp. 296-301, 339-40. 
36 Id. 
37 R. Vol. 2, pp. 141, 207. Although the Master Agreement between WGI and SIO expired by its 
own terms on December 1, 2005, the Second Addendum between WGI and Monsanto reference 
sand availability and payments through the end of 2007. R. Vol. 2, p. 197. This would explain 
why WGI was able to sell silica sand to SIO through the end of 2007 despite the expiration of the 
Master Agreement. 
38 Id. at p. 218. 
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After various discussions and emails, Monsanto delivered a letter to SIO advising SIO 
that it would be permitted to continue processing and bagging silica sand through April 29, 
2008.39 Monsanto advised that it would not provide any additional silica sand to SIO after that 
date. 40 Thereafter, SIO dismantled its operations in the quartzite mine and removed its buildings 
and equipment.41 After SIO dismantled its operations, Monsanto and WGI have not operated a 
silica sand processing business in the quartzite mine.42 
III. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On December 31, 2009, SIO filed a Complaint against Monsanto and WGI seeking 
damages for what it believed was a violation of its alleged right to continue purchasing processed 
silica sand from the quartzite mine.43 Despite having not made any profit in seven (7) years, SIO 
sought to recover $4,729,000 for damages allegedly incurred through October 2011, an 
additional $991,401 in prejudgment interest, and an additional $25,607,000 for alleged future 
lost profits.44 
Ignoring Monsanto's refusal to execute SIO's draft contract and also the written contract 
between itself and WGI, SIO alleged in its Complaint that SIO and Monsanto had entered into a 
separate verbal agreement with Monsanto for the purchase and sale of the very same silica sand 
39 d Ii . at p. 231. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. atp. 141. 
42 Id. 
43 R. Vol. 1, pp. 1-20. 
44 R. Vol. 3, pp. 409-14; R. Vol. 4, pp. 664-68. 
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it had entered into a written agreement to acquire from WGI. 45 SIO claimed that this alleged 
separate and duplicative verbal agreement consisted of the following terms: 
(1) Monsanto agreed that it would furnish SIO with "certain agreed-upon quantities" 
of silica sand and allow SIO to process that silica sand;46 
(2) SIO agreed that it would pay Monsanto in "agreed-upon amounts" for the silica 
sand, would comply with all applicable environmental, safety and control 
regulations, and would comply with limitations imposed by Monsanto with regard 
to markets in which SIO would sell the processed silica sand;47 
(3) Monsanto agreed that SIO would be entitled to receive silica sand indefinitel/8 so 
long as SIO did not breach any of the aforementioned terrns;49 and 
( 4) Monsanto agreed that it "would not abruptly terminate its agreement within a few 
years after SIO had commenced its business."50 
45 R. Vol. 1, pp. 1-20. 
46 R. Vol. 1, pp. 3-4 (Complaint at ,11); R. Vol. 3, pp. 438-46 (Affidavit of Todd Sullivan at ,4). 
47 Id. 
48 In paragraphs 27 and 28 of the Complaint, SIO alleges that the duration of the verbal 
agreement was "perpetual" and "open-ended." R. Vol. 1, p. 7 (italics added). Notwithstanding, 
SIO appears to have change its position on appeal by arguing that "[t]he evidence before the 
district court on summary judgment was that Monsanto, like SIO, contemplated a long-term 
relationship--not necessarily perpetual.. .of something more than seven years." Appellant's 
Opening Brief at p. 24. 
49 R. Vol. 1, pp. 3-4 (Complaint at ~11 ); R. Vol. 3, pp. 438-46 (Affidavit of Todd Sullivan at ,4). 
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SIO claimed that this alleged verbal agreement remained enforceable separate and apart from its 
subsequently executed Master Agreement with WGL 51 Even though the Master Agreement was 
rightfully terminated by WGI after expiration of its five-year term and SIO does not challenge 
that fact on appeal, SIO claims that the alleged verbal agreement with Monsanto remains 
separately enforceable - indefinitely. 
Based upon the alleged the verbal agreement, SIO asserted four causes of action against 
Monsanto: (a) breach of the alleged verbal agreement with Monsanto; (b) breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing under the verbal agreement; (c) equitable estoppel, and 
(d) quasi-estoppel.52 On February 26, 2010, Monsanto filed its Answer, generally denying SIO's 
claims and asserting certain affirmative defenses including a defense based upon the statute of 
frauds set forth in LC.§ 28-2-201(1). 53 
On January 25, 2011, Monsanto filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing (1) that 
the verbal contract alleged by SIO was unenforceable under the statute of frauds set forth in LC. 
50 R. Vol. I, p. 5 (Complaint at fil 7); R. Vol. 3, p. 440 (Affidavit of Todd Sullivan at fi8). It 
should be noted that SIO incorrectly suggests on page 15 of its Opening Brief that there are 
additional terms in the alleged verbal agreement whereby Monsanto agreed (1) to permit SIO to 
build, operate and access a silica sand processing plant, and (2) to furnish sand "in quantities 
sufficient for [SIO] to meet its business need." SIO claims that these additional terms are 
supported by the record at pages R. 438-39 and 443-46. However, a review of those pages from 
the record readily reveals that these additional alleged terms are neither mentioned nor 
supported. Therefore, they should be disregarded for purposes of this appeal. 
51 R. Vol. 1, pp. 1-20 (Complaint). 
52 Id. SIO also asserted certain causes of action against WGL Those causes of action will not be 
addressed in this brief. 
53 Id. at p. 36. 
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§ 28-2-201 (1 ); (2) that the verbal agreement alleged by SI 0 was unenforceable because the terms 
as alleged were vague, indefinite and uncertain; (3) that SIO could not prove damages because it 
never generated a profit; ( 4) that SIO did not have the proper corporate status to file the lawsuit; 
and (5) that SIO's causes of action for equitable estoppel or quasi-estoppel should be 
d. . d 54 1sm1sse . On April 29, 2011, SIO filed an Opposition to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment.55 On May 6, 2011, Monsanto filed a Reply.56 
In support of its Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, SIO filed an Affidavit 
of Todd Sullivan.57 In paragraph 6 of the affidavit, Mr. Sullivan testifies about statements 
contained within an email dated March 14, 2008 that he purportedly received from Mr. Hart 
years after Mr. Hart's employment with Monsanto had ended (hereinafter "Hart's 3/14/2008 
email"). 58 A copy of the email was attached to the affidavit. 59 On May 6, 2011, Monsanto filed 
a Motion to Strike from this affidavit any reference to statements made in Hart's 3/14/2008 email 
on the basis that they constituted inadmissible hearsay.60 On May 13, 2011, SIO filed an 
54 Id. at pp. 79-97; R. Vol. 5, pp. 724-38. 
55 R. Vol. 3, pp. 357-89. 
56 R. Vol. 5, pp. 724-38. 
57 R. Vol. 3, p. 439. 
ss Id. 
59 Id. at pp. 447-48. 
60 R. Vol. 5, pp. 752-60. Monsanto's Motion to Strike also sought to exclude other emails 
mentioned in affidavits filed by SIO in opposition to summary judgment. The district court 
denied the motion with regard to those other emails. Monsanto does not challenge that decision 
on appeal. 
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Opposition to the Motion to Strike, arguing that the email was not hearsay and alternatively was 
admissible under the residual hearsay exception found in I.R.E. 803(24).61 
On May 13, 2011, a hearing on Monsanto's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion 
to Strike was held.62 At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court took the matter under 
d . 63 a v1sement. 
On September 21, 2011, the district court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order, 
granting the Motion to Strike with regard to Hart's 3/14/2008 email and granting summary 
judgment in favor of Monsanto. With regard to the Motion to Strike, the district court granted 
the motion and excluded from Mr. Sullivan's affidavit the reference to Hart's 3114/2008 email on 
the basis that it constituted hearsay which did not fit within the residual hearsay exception of 
I.RE 803(24).64 
With regard to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the district court dismissed SIO's 
causes of action for breach of the alleged verbal agreement and breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing on the basis that the underlying verbal agreement as alleged by SIO 
was unenforceable pursuant to the statute of frauds in LC. § 28-2-201(1).65 The district court 
also granted summary judgment as to SIO's causes of action for equitable estoppel and quasi-
estoppel on the basis that the underlying verbal agreement which SIO sought to enforce under 
61 Id. at pp. 761-70. 
62 Id. at pp. 771-72. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at pp. 782-83. 
65 Id. at pp. 786-89. 
16 
those theories was unenforceable because its essential terms were vague, indefinite and 
. 66 uncertam. 
On October 7, 2011, the district court entered Judgment in accordance with its 
Memorandum Decision and Order.67 On November 18, 2011, SIO filed its Notice of Appeal.68 
66 Id. at pp. 789-92. 
67 Id. at pp. 799-801. 
68 Id. at pp. 802-07. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment as to SIO's causes of 
action for breach of the alleged verbal agreement and breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing on the basis that the alleged verbal agreement was 
unenforceable under the statute of frauds in I.C. § 28-2-201(1)? 
2. ·whether the district court's grant of summary judgment as to SIO's causes of action for 
breach of the alleged verbal agreement and breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing can be affirmed on the alternative ground that the alleged verbal 
agreement was enforceable due to its essential terms being vague, indefinite and 
uncertain? 
3. Whether the district court properly considered Monsanto's motion for summary judgment 
with regard to SI O's causes of action for equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel? 
4. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment as to SIO's cause of 
action for equitable estoppel? 
5. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment as to SIO's cause of 
action for quasi-estoppel? 
6. Whether the district court's grant of Monsanto's Motion to Strike with regard to Hart's 
3/14/2008 email should be affirmed? 
7. Whether Monsanto is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The Idaho Supreme Court "reviews appeals from an order of summary judgment de 
nova." Stonebrook Constr., LLC v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, 2012 Idaho LEXIS 106, Docket 
No. 37868 (Idaho Sup. Ct. April 26, 2012). A trial court's grant of summary judgment is 
reviewed under the same standard applied by the trial court. Read v. Harvey, 141 Idaho 497, 
499, 112 P .3d 785, 787 (2005). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
Under this standard, a reviewing court will construe all disputed facts and make all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Sprinkler Irr. Co. v. John Deere Ins. Co., 139 Idaho 
691, 695-96, 85 P.3d 667, 671-72 (2004). Where "the evidence reveals no disputed issues of 
material fact, then only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review." 
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644 
(2006). 
II. MOTION TO STRIKE 
"The admissibility of evidence under I.R.C.P. 56(e) is a threshold question the trial court 
must analyze before applying the rules governing motions for summary judgment." Herrera v. 
Estay, 146 Idaho 67 4, 680, 201 P .3d 64 7, 654 (2009). "The trial court must look at the affidavit 
or deposition testimony and determine whether it alleges facts, which if taken as true, would 
render the testimony admissible." Id. "The admission of evidence is committed to the discretion 
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of the trial court." Id. This Court reviews a trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of 
discretion. Shane v. Blair, 139 Idaho 126, 128, 75 P.3d 180, 182 (2003). Thus, this Court 
considers whether: (1) the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) the trial 
court acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and with applicable legal standards; and (3) 
the trial court reached its decision through an exercise ofreason. Herrera, 146 Idaho at 680, 201 
P.3d at 654. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS 
TO SIO'S CAUSES OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF THE ALLEGED VERBAL 
AGREEMENT AND BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD 
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING ON THE BASIS THAT THE ALLEGED VERBAL 
AGREEMENT WAS UNENFORCEABLE UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
IN I.C. § 28-2-201(1). 
SIO's causes of action for breach of the alleged verbal agreement and breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are both contingent upon the enforceability of the 
alleged verbal agreement with Monsanto. On summary judgment, the district court concluded 
that the verbal agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds set forth in LC. § 28-2-
201(1), which provides in pertinent part the following: 
[A] contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable 
by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that 
a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party 
against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. 
The district court found that no genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to the fact that 
the alleged verbal agreement was "a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more" 
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and that no document signed by Monsanto existed which evidenced the alleged agreement.69 
Based upon those findings, the district court concluded that the verbal agreement was 
unenforceable under LC. § 28-2-201 (1 ). The conclusion of the district court should be affirmed. 
A. The district court correctly found that the verbal agreement alleged by SIO 
was "a contract for the sale of goods" for purpose of Article 2 of the Idaho 
Uniform Commercial Code and LC.§ 28-2-201(1). 
On appeal, SIO argues that the district court erred in finding that the alleged verbal 
agreement was "a contract for the sale of goods" for purposes of Article 2 of the Idaho Unifo1m 
Commercial Code and I.C. § 28-2-201(1). SIO's argument is without merit. 
First, SIO argues that the verbal agreement was not "a contract for the sale of goods" 
solely because the verbal agreement included both "sale" and "non-sale" terms.70 SIO admits 
that the verbal agreement involved the sale of goods by alleging Monsanto agreed to supply 
silica sand to SIO and SIO agreed to pay Monsanto for that silica sand.71 SIO also admitted in 
its opposition to summary judgment that "SIO paid Monsanto directly in exchange for sand sold 
by Monsanto."72 Notwithstanding this admission, SIO claims that the alleged verbal agreement 
was not "solely for the sale of goods."73 SIO claims that, in addition to involving the sale of 
goods, the verbal agreement also included additional "non-sale" terms, such as: (1) SIO agreeing 
69 R. Vol. 5, pp. 786-89. 
70 Appellant's Opening Brief at pp. 15-19. 
71 Id. at p. 15; see also R. Vol. 1, pp. 3-4 (Complaint). 
72 R. Vol. 3, p. 383 (underline added). SIO claims that it "paid Monsanto directly" is not 
supported by the record. The undisputed evidence in the record is that all payments made by 
SIO for silica sand were tendered to WGI and not to Monsanto. R. Vol. 2, pp. 140-41. 
73 Id. 
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to comply with all applicable environmental, safety and control regulations; (2) SIO agreeing to 
comply with restrictions on the markets in which SIO would sell the processed silica sand; (3) 
Monsanto agreeing to allow SIO to process the silica sand; and (4) Monsanto agreeing to provide 
silica sand to SIO indefinitely so long as SIO did not breach the terms of the alleged verbal 
agreement.74 SIO appears to argue that the mixture of both "sale" and "non-sale" terms in the 
alleged verbal agreement automatically precludes it from being considered "a contract for the 
sale of goods" for purposes of Article 2 of the Idaho Uniform Commercial Code. SIO cites no 
case law supporting this position. 
Second, SIO alternatively argues that the alleged verbal agreement is not "a contract for 
the sale of goods" because its "heart" is somehow not the sale of silica sand from Monsanto to 
SIO. SIO claims that "the SIO/Monsanto [verbal] contract does not, at its heart, concern the sale 
of sand" but is instead an agreement "permitting SIO to operate a business."75 Based upon its 
belief that the "heart" of the alleged verbal agreement was not the sale of silica sand, SIO argues 
that the verbal agreement is therefore not "a contract for the sale of goods" for purposes of 
Article 2 of the Idaho Uniform Commercial Code.76 Again, SIO cites no case law supporting 
this position. 
74 Appellant's Opening Brief at pp. 15-16, 19. See also footnotes 48 and 50 above. 
75 Id. at p. 16 (italics added). 
76 Id. 
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For the following reasons, this Court should reject SIO's arguments that the alleged 
verbal agreement was not "a contract for the sale of goods" because it included "non-sale" terms, 
or alternatively, because its "heart" was not the sale of goods. 
First, the verbal agreement as alleged by SIO can be construed as nothing more and 
nothing less than an alleged sale of silica sand with supplemental sale terms allowing for the 
processing and resale of that same silica sand. Thus, it cannot be disputed that the alleged 
agreement involves the sale of goods. "It is clear that if the underlying transaction to the contract 
involves the sale of goods, the UCC would apply." Fox v. Mountain West Electric, Inc., 137 
Idaho 703, 709, 52 P.3d 848, 854 (2002); see also LC. § 28-2-102. Because the verbal 
agreement as alleged by SIO involves the sale of goods, there can be no question that it is "a 
contract for the sale of goods" subject to Article 2 and its statute of frauds in LC. § 28-2-201(1). 
On this basis alone, SIO's arguments should be rejected. 
Second, even if the alleged verbal agreement is construed to contain both "sale" and 
"non-sale" terms, SIO's arguments should still be rejected. The Idaho Supreme Court has had 
occasion to consider the application of Article 2 of the Idaho Uniform Commercial Code to 
contracts that involve both the "sale of goods" falling within the scope of Article 2 and other 
provisions which in isolation may not be subject to Article 2 of the Idaho Uniform Commercial 
Code. Such contracts are referred to as involving a "hybrid transaction." Fox, 137 Idaho at 709, 
52 P.3d at 854; see also Pittsley v. Houser, 125 Idaho 820, 822, 875 P.2d 232, 234 (Ct. App. 
1994 ). When presented with a hybrid transaction, the district court looks past the fact that there 
is a mix of "sale" terms and "non-sale" or "non-goods" terms and instead simply "look[ s] at the 
predominant factor of the transaction to determine if the UCC applies." Fox, 137 Idaho at 710, 
52 P.3d at 855. 
The test for inclusion or exclusion [with regard to the UCC] is not whether 
[the terms] are mixed, but, granting that they are mixed, whether their 
predominant factor, their thrust, their purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendition 
of service, with goods incidentally involved (e.g., contract with artist for painting) 
or is a transaction for sale, with labor incidentally involved (e.g., installation of a 
water heater in a bathroom). This test essentially involves consideration of the 
contract in its entirety, applying the UCC to the entire contract or not at all. 
Id. (quoting Pittsley, 125 Idaho at 822, 875 P.2d at 234)(emphasis added). 77 
The legal standard from the Fox case disposes of SIO's first argument that the alleged 
verbal agreement is automatically not "a contract for the sale of goods" because it includes both 
"sale" and "non-sale" terms. As stated in Fox and quoted above, "The test for inclusion or 
exclusion [within the Idaho UCC] is not whether (the terms] are mixed." Fox, 137 Idaho at 710, 
52 P.3d at 855 (quoting Pittsley, 125 Idaho at 822, 875 P.2d at 234 (emphasis added). As a 
matter of law, a contract is not automatically precluded from the application of Article 2 of the 
Idaho Uniform Commercial Code simply because it may include both "sale" and "non-sale" 
terms. 
The legal standard from the Fox case also disposes of SIO's second argument that the 
alleged verbal agreement is not "a contract for the sale of goods" because its "heart" was not the 
77 This "predominant factor" test has been consistently applied by Idaho appellate courts 
whenever a single contract involves both the sale of "goods" within the scope of Article 2 and 
other terms that independently may not fall within the scope of Article 2. See, e.g., Apple's 
Mobile Catering, LLC v. O'Dell, 149 Idaho 211, 233 P.3d 142 (2010)(holding that UCC applied 
to entire contract even though goodwill is not a "good" within the scope of Article 2 because the 
predominant factor of the transaction was the sale of "goods" falling with the scope of Article 2). 
24 
sale of goods. Pursuant to the Fox case, the "predominant factor" test attempts to determine the 
"thrust" and primary "purpose" of the alleged verbal agreement by analyzing whether the sale of 
silica sand from Monsanto to SIO is merely incidental to the so-called "non-sale" terms or 
whether the so-called "non-sale" terms were incidental to the sale of silica sand. 
The answer to this question is quite simple. The alleged sale of silica sand from 
Monsanto to SIO is at the core of the verbal agreement. Without silica sand, SIO would have no 
business. Indeed, SIO's entire business plan was to process and sell silica sand. In addition, 
none of the so-called "non-sale" terms would have had any application or purpose whatsoever if 
SIO did not purchase silica sand from Monsanto. The so-called "non-sale" terms alleged to be 
part of the verbal agreement are clearly "incidental" to SIO purchase of the silica sand from 
Monsanto. Therefore, the alleged sale of silica sand from Monsanto to SIO was as a matter of 
law the "predominant factor" of the verbal agreement as alleged by SIO. 
"The question of whether goods or services predominate in a hybrid contract is one of 
fact", but, "where there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding the provisions of the 
alleged contract, the district court may resolve the issue as matter of law." Allmand Assocs., Inc. 
v. Hercules Inc., 960 S. Supp. 1216, 1223 (E.D. Mich. 1997); see also O'Donovan v. Burns, 5 
Mass. L. Rep. 317, *8 (Mass. Super. 1996)(same). This same approach appears to have been 
applied by appellate courts applying Idaho's Uniform Commercial Code. See Fox v. Mountain 
West Electric, Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 52 P.3d 848 (2002); Pittsley v. Houser, 125 Idaho 820, 875 
P.2d 232 (1994); US. v. Twin Falls, 806 F.2d 862 (91h Cir. 1986)(applying Idaho UCC). In this 
case for summary judgment purposes, there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding the 
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terms of the verbal agreement as alleged by SIO, if such a verbal agreement exists. Thus, the 
predominant factor question can be resolved as a matter of law. The district court was correct in 
doing so in this case. 
Because the "predominant factor" of the alleged verbal agreement was the sale of silica 
sand, the entire verbal agreement as alleged by SIO is treated as a "contract for the sale of 
goods." See Fox, 137 Idaho at 710, 52 P.3d at 855. The district court therefore correctly 
determined that the alleged verbal agreement fell within the scope of Article 2 of the Idaho 
Uniform Commercial Code and its statute of frauds in LC.§ 28-2-201(1). 
B. SIO has not challenged on appeal the district court's finding that the alleged 
verbal contract was for more than $500. 
In finding that the alleged verbal agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds 
in LC. § 28-2-201(1), the district court implicitly found that the verbal contract was for more 
than $500. See Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 79-80, 205 P.3d 1209, 1215-26 
(2009)(affirming implicit findings of district court). SIO has never argued that the verbal 
agreement was for less than $500 and has waived any challenge to this finding by not raising it 
on appeal. 
C. SIO has not challenged on appeal the district court's implicit finding that no 
document signed by Monsanto exists which evidences the alleged verbal 
agreement. 
In finding that the alleged verbal agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds 
in LC. § 28-2-201(1), the district court implicitly found that no document signed by Monsanto 
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exists which evidences the alleged verbal agreement.78 See Borah, 147 Idaho at 79-80, 205 P.3d 
at 1215-26 (affirming implicit findings of district court). SIO has waived any challenge to this 
finding by not raising it on appeal. Even if SIO had raised the issue, the record is devoid of any 
such document. 
D. SIO has not challenged on appeal the district court's finding that no 
exceptions apply to the application of the statute of frauds in I.C. § 28-2-
201(1 ). 
In finding that the alleged verbal agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds 
in I.C. § 28-2-201(1), the district court found that no exceptions to the statute of frauds applied in 
this case.79 SIO has waived any challenge to this finding by not raising it on appeal. 
E. The district court properly concluded that the alleged verbal agreement was 
unenforceable under the statute of frauds in I.C. § 28-2-201(1). 
The district court properly found that the alleged verbal agreement was "a contract for the 
sale of goods", that it was for more than $500, that no document signed by Monsanto existed 
evidencing the alleged verbal agreement, and that no exceptions to the statute of frauds applied 
in this case. Based on these findings, the district court properly found that the alleged verbal 
agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds in LC. § 28-2-201 (1 ). 
This Court should affirm the district court's finding that the alleged verbal agreement was 
unenforceable. SI O's causes of action for breach of the verbal agreement and for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are dependent upon an enforceable verbal 
78 R. Vol. 5, pp. 786-89. 
79 Id. 
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agreement. Because the verbal agreement was found to be unenforceable, this Court should also 
affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Monsanto dismissing SIO's 
causes of action for breach of the verbal agreement and for breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO SIO'S 
CAUSES OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF THE ALLEGED VERBAL 
AGREEMENT AND BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD 
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING CAN BE AFFIRMED ON THE ALTERNATIVE 
GROUND THAT THE ALLEGED VERBAL AGREEMENT WAS 
UNEN:FORCEABLE DUE TO ITS ESSENTIAL TERMS BEING VAGUE, 
INDEFINITE AND UNCERTAIN. 
Notwithstanding the statute of frauds argument addressed above, the district court's 
dismissal on summary judgment of SIO's causes of action for breach of the alleged verbal 
agreement and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be affirmed on 
the alternative ground that the alleged verbal agreement was unenforceable due to its essential 
terms being vague, indefinite and uncertain.80 See Ewing v. DOT, 147 Idaho 305, 306, 208 P.3d 
287, 288 (2009)("Where an order of a lower court is correct, but is based upon an erroneous 
theory, the order will be affirmed upon the correct theory."). 
"An agreement that is so vague, indefinite and uncertain that the intent of the parties 
cannot be ascertained is unenforceable, and the courts are left with no choice but to leave the 
parties as they found them." Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., LLC, 143 Idaho 733, 737, 152 
P .3d 604, 609 (2007). "Vagueness of expression, indefiniteness and uncertainty as to any of the 
80 Monsanto raised this argument below. See R. Vol. 1, pp. 90-92. 
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essential terms of an agreement, have often been held to prevent the creation of an enforceable 
contract." Lawrence v. Jones, 124 Idaho 748, 752, 864 P.2d 194, 198 (Ct. App. 1993)(quoting 1 
Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts§ 4.1 (rev. ed. 1993)). 
"To be enforceable, a contract must provide a price or a means of determining the price." 
Bauchman-Kingston Partnership, LP v. Haroldsen, 149 Idaho 87, 93, 233 P.3d 18, 24 
(2008)(intemal citations omitted); see also Traylor v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 99 Idaho 560, 562, 
585 P.2d 970, 972 (1978)("In the absence of an agreement between the parties regarding the 
amount to be paid ... there was a failure to agree on an essential term of the contract. Such an 
agreement is too indefinite to enforce."). In addition, under Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, "the quantity of goods" is also an essential term of a contract. See I.C. § 28-
2-201(1); Mitchell v. Barendregt, 120 Idaho 837, 845, 820 P.2d 707, 715 (Ct. App. 1991). The 
verbal agreement as alleged by SIO lacks both an essential price term and an essential quantity 
term. As to price, SIO alleges only that Monsanto would accept payment of "agreed-upon 
amounts."81 As to quantity, SIO alleges only that Monsanto would provide "certain agreed-upon 
quantities."82 The verbal agreement as alleged by SIO is unenforceable as a matter of law 
because its price and quantity terms as alleged by SIO are vague, indefinite and uncertain. 
Under the facts of this particular case, the district court found that duration was also an 
essential terms of the alleged verbal agreement.83 Terms "at issue in the negotiations" are 
81 R. Vol. 1, pp. 3-4 (Complaint at ~11); R. Vol. 3, pp. 438-46 (Affidavit of Todd Sullivan at ~4). 
s2 Id. 
83 R. Vol. 5, p. 789-91. 
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considered "essential terms to that particular agreement." Ogden v. Griffth, 149 Idaho 489, 496, 
236 P.3d 1249, 1256 (2010). As alleged by SIO, duration was a critical term of the alleged 
verbal agreement and indeed forms the basis of SIO's causes of action. Thus, the district court 
properly considered whether the duration term as alleged by SIO was sufficiently certain and 
definite to be enforceable. 
Although SIO's Complaint alleges that the duration of the verbal agreement was 
"perpetual" and "open-ended,"84 SIO now appears to be arguing on appeal that "[t]he evidence 
before the district court on summary judgment was that Monsanto, like SIO, contemplated a 
long-term relationship--not necessarily perpetual. .. of something more than seven years."85 SIO 
does not attempt to define "long-term relationship" other than to suggest that it may be 
somewhere between seven (7) years and something shy of forever. In other words, even SIO 
itself has no idea how long the alleged verbal agreement was to continue. This should be 
construed as an admission by SIO on appeal that the duration term as alleged by SIO is indeed 
vague, indefinite and uncertain. 
The vagueness, indefiniteness and uncertainty of any one of the three essential terms of 
price, quantity and duration are fatal to the enforceability of the alleged verbal agreement. In this 
case, all three happen to be vague, indefinite and uncertain. Therefore, the verbal agreement as 
alleged by SIO is, as a matter of law, unenforceable because its alleged terms are "so vague, 
indefinite and uncertain that the intent of the parties cannot be ascertained." Griffith, 14 3 Idaho 
84 R. Vol. 1, p. 7 (Complaint at ifil 27-28). 
85 Appellant's Opening Brief at p. 24. See also footnote 48 above. 
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at 737, 152 P.3d at 609 (2007). The district court's dismissal of SIO's causes of action for 
breach of the alleged verbal agreement and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing can be affirmed on the alternative ground that the alleged verbal agreement was 
unenforceable due to its essential terms being vague, indefinite and uncertain. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED AND RULED ON 
MONSANTO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO SIO'S CAUSES 
OF ACTION FOR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND QUASI-ESTOPPEL. 
On appeal, SIO challenges the district court's dismissal on summary judgment of its 
causes of action for equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel. SIO contends that Monsanto's initial 
summary judgment memorandum did not "articulate a basis for summary judgment on those 
claims"86 of equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel and that the district court should therefore not 
have granted summary judgment with regard to those causes of action. 87 
SIO sought to use the doctrines of equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel as bars to the 
applicability of the statute of frauds in I.C. § 28-2-201(1). In other words, SIO was hoping to 
enforce the alleged verbal agreement under equitable estoppel or quasi-estoppel in the event that 
it was found unenforceable under the statute of frauds. However, the district court ultimately 
found that the alleged verbal agreement as too vague, indefinite and uncertain to enforce. 88 
Given that the doctrines of equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel are of no effect when dealing 
86 Appellant's Opening Brief at p. 20. 
87 Id. at pp. 20-22. 
88 R. Vol. 5, pp. 789-92. 
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with a vague, indefinite, and uncertain agreement, dismissal of SIO's claims for equitable 
estoppel and quasi-estoppel was appropriate. 
Under the law in Idaho, "a nonmoving party in a summary judgment motion need only 
respond to issues raised by the moving party." State v. Rubbermaid Inc., 129 Idaho 353, 356, 
924 P.2d 615, 618 (1996). SIO contends that Monsanto's initial summary judgment 
memorandum did not "articulate a basis for summary judgment on those claims" for equitable 
estoppel and quasi-estoppel.89 SIO's contention is incorrect. 
In its initial summary judgment memorandum, Monsanto argued at length that the 
essential tenns of the verbal agreement alleged by SIO were too vague, indefinite and uncertain 
to be enforceable. 90 SIO was thereafter obligated to respond to that argument on summary 
judgment and in fact did respond to that argument in its response brief.91 SIO should not be 
surprised that the district court granted summary judgment on that basis. Once the alleged 
verbal agreement is found unenforceable on the basis that its essential terms are vague, indefinite 
and uncertain, causes of action for equitable estoppel or quasi-estoppel are of no further effect. 
Consequently, the district court was correct in dismissing those causes of action. 
Since Monsanto's initial summary judgment brief did in fact seek summary judgment on 
the basis that the alleged verbal agreement was unenforceable on the grounds that its essential 
terms were too vague, indefinite and uncertain to be enforceable, this Court should reject SIO's 
89 Appellant's Opening Brief at p. 20. 
90 R. Vol. 1, pp. 90-92. 
91 R. Vol. 3, pp. 380-83. 
32 
contention that Monsanto's initial summary judgment memorandum did not "articulate a basis 
for summary judgment on those claims" for equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel.92 For this 
reason and the reasons discussed below, the district court's dismissal on summary judgment of 
SIO' s causes of action for equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel should be affirmed. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS 
TO SIO'S CAUSES OF ACTION FOR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL. 
On appeal, SIO challenges the district court's dismissal on summary judgment of its 
cause of action against Monsanto for equitable estoppel.93 The elements of equitable estoppel 
are: 
(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or 
constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not 
know or could not discover the truth; (3) that the false representation or 
concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon; and (4) that the 
person to whom the representation was made, or from whom the facts were 
concealed, relied and acted upon the representation or concealment to his 
prejudice. 
Ogden, 149 Idaho at 495, 236 P.3d at 1255. Equitable estoppel may upon satisfaction of its 
elements bar the application of the statute of frauds. Id. Although equitable estoppel may be a 
92 Appellant's Opening Brief at p. 20. 
93 In dismissing the equitable estoppel cause of action, the district court suggested that the only 
alleged promise SIO was attempting to enforce through the application of equitable estoppel was 
the alleged promise that Monsanto "would not abruptly terminate its agreement within a few 
years after SIO had commenced its business." R. Vol. 5, p. 790-91. This is not entirely accurate. 
Through its equitable estoppel cause of action, SIO was attempting to enforce every term of the 
verbal agreement as they had been alleged by SIO in this case. See, e.g., R. Vol. 1, pp. 11-14 
(Complaint at ,~50-64 with particular emphasis on ,,51 and 56). In other words, SIO was 
attempting to use equitable estoppel as a bar to the statute of frauds with regard to the entire 
alleged verbal agreement. 
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bar to the application of the statute of frauds, the underlying representation (i.e. the verbal 
agreement) will nevertheless remain unenforceable if its essential terms are vague, indefinite and 
uncertain. 94 Id.; see also Chapin v. Linden, 144 Idaho 393, 396-97, 162 P.3d 772, 775-76 
(2007). 
As discussed above in Section II of this brief, the essential terms of price, quantity and 
duration of the verbal agreement as alleged by SIO are vague, indefinite and uncertain. The 
alleged verbal agreement is therefore unenforceable as a matter oflaw. See Griffith, 143 Idaho at 
737, 152 P.3d at 609 (2007). The doctrine of equitable estoppel cannot save an alleged 
agreement that is otherwise unenforceable because its essential terms are vague, indefinite and 
uncertain. Therefore, the district court's dismissal of SIO's cause of action for equitable estoppel 
should be affirmed. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS 
TO SIO'S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR QUASI-ESTOPPEL. 
The district court dismissed SIO's cause of action for quasi-estoppel for the same reason 
that it dismissed it cause of action for equitable estoppel.95 Quasi-estoppel "precludes a party 
from asserting to another's disadvantage a right inconsistent with a position previously taken by 
94 For this reason, it was unnecessary for the district court to consider the four elements of 
equitable estoppel. Although the district court discussed the first element, SIO incorrectly 
suggests that the district court made a "factual" determination concerning whether a 
representation made by Monsanto was "false." Rather, the district court merely found that the 
representation (i.e. the duration of the verbal agreement) was too indefinite to determine its 
falsity. Consequently, the district court concluded, "this Court, on the record before it on 
summary judgment, cannot find that there are disputed issues of material fact concerning 
whether this is a 'false representation."' R. Vol. 5, p. 791. 
95 R. Vol. 5, pp. 791-92. 
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him or her . . . where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position 
inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced or of which he accepted a benefit." Garner v. 
Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 437, 80 P.3d 1031, 1038 (2003). Although SIO is attempting to use the 
doctrine of quasi-estoppel to bar the application of the statute of frauds, the underlying 
representation (i.e. the verbal agreement) will nevertheless remain unenforceable if its essential 
terms are vague, indefinite and uncertain. Id.; see also Chapin, 144 Idaho at 396-97, 162 P.3d at 
775-76. As discussed above, the alleged verbal agreement is unenforceable because its essential 
terms of price, quantity, and duration are vague, indefinite, and uncertain. The doctrine of quasi-
estoppel cannot save an alleged agreement that is otherwise enforceable because its essential 
terms are vague, indefinite and uncertain. Therefore, the district court's dismissal of SIO's cause 
of action for quasi- estoppel should therefore be affirmed. 
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OF MONSANTO'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
WITH REGARD TO HART'S 3/14/2008 EMAIL SHOULD BE AFFIR.l\fED. 
In opposition to Monsanto's Motion for Summary Judgment, SIO submitted the Affidavit 
of Todd Sullivan.96 Paragraph 6 of that affidavit stated: 
On or about March 13, 2008, I sent another email to Hart, asking him to 
confirm the accuracy of certain language I intended to include in correspondence 
to Monsanto. Hart responded on March 14, 2008, by noting that my proposed 
language "is a fair representation of our discussions and emails." A true and 
correct copy of this email chain, commencing with my March 13, 2008, email to 
Hart and culminating with Hart's March 14, 2008, response, is attached hereto as 
Exhibit B.97 
96 R. Vol. 3, p. 437. 
97 Id. at pp. 439, 447-48. 
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The attached email from Todd Sullivan dated March 13, 2008, asked that Mr. Hart confirm 
whether he was "comfortable" with the following statement: 
In conversations and emails I have had with Mitch Hart, we both concur 
that an agreement exists between Monsanto and Silicon International Ore in that 
Monsanto represented to us that we would be allowed to continue to operate as 
long as it was mutually beneficial for us to do so. Meaning that we would be 
required to conform to all of Monsanto's environmental, safety and control 
regulations, provide Monsanto with royalty payments that would more than offset 
any costs Monsanto might incur from our operation, and allow Monsanto to 
reasonably control which markets we were able to sell to. Monsanto in tum 
assures us certain volumes of sand and allow us to continue to operate the 
business. Washington Group International was brought into the mix to help 
facilitate this agreement. 98 
The attached email from Mr. Hart dated March 14, 2008, stated: "Your statement below is a fair 
representation of our discussions and emails."99 At the time ofthis email, Mr. Hart had for quite 
some time not been employed by Monsanto. 100 
Monsanto filed a Motion to Strike Hart's 3/14/2008 email and any reference to it on the 
basis that the alleged statements contained therein constituted inadmissible hearsay. 101 In 
98 Id. at p. 448. 
99 Id. at p. 447. 
100 R. Vol. 2, p. 240. Mr. Hart was employed by Monsanto as a mining engineer from 1986 to 
2005. Id. He was not a manager and did not have any authority to contract on behalf of 
Monsanto. Id. In 2008, approximately three years after he voluntarily left his employment with 
Monsanto, Mr. Hart was contacted by Mr. Sullivan, who was inquiring about his recollection of 
conversations that took place between SIO and Monsanto eight (8) years earlier in 2000. Id. at p. 
241. In responding to Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Hart did not have the benefit of any files, notes or any 
of the written contracts to refresh his memory. Id. After reviewing those documents, Mr. Hart 
later testified, "To the extent that these emails sent by me in 2008 suggested that there was an 
agreement entered into between Monsanto and SIO in 2000 would be in error and a mistake of 
mine in 2008 when I was attempting to recollect conversations that occurred 8 years earlier in 
early 2000." Id. 
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response, SIO argued that Hart's 3/14/2008 email was not hearsay and was alternatively 
admissible under the residual hearsay exception found in I.R.E. 803(24 ). 102 The district court 
disagreed and granted Monsanto's Motion to Strike the reference in Mr. Sullivan's affidavit to 
Hart's 3/14/2008 email for purpose of summary judgment. 103 
The district court's grant of Monsanto's Motion to Strike with regard to Hart's 3/14/2008 
email should be affirmed on two alternative grounds. First, it should be affirmed because the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence. Second, it should be 
affirmed because the exclusion of Hart's 3/14/2008 email did not affect a substantial right. 
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Hart's 3/14/2008 
email from its consideration on summary judgment. 
SIO does not appear to challenge on appeal the district court's decision that the statement 
made in Hart's 3/14/2008 email was hearsay. Nevertheless, for the argument on appeal, it is 
important to underst~u1d why it is hearsay. It is hearsay because the substance of the email was 
offered through the testimony of Mr. Sullivan. Through his affidavit, Mr. Sullivan testifies 
concerning the substance of communications made by another person to prove the truth of the 
statement made in that communication. This is classic hearsay. See I.RE. 80l(c)('"Hearsay' is 
a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered 
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."). 
101 R. Vol. 5, pp. 752-59. 
102 Jd. at pp. 761-70. 
103 Id. at pp. 781-86. 
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SIO argued below that Hart's 3/14/2008 email was admissible under the residual hearsay 
exception of I.R.E. 803(24 ). 
To be admissible under I.R.E. 803(24), the court must determine that (A) the 
statement has circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those 
in Rules 803(1) to 803(23), (B) the statement is offered as evidence of a material 
fact, (C) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than 
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts, 
and (D) the general purposes of the rules of evidence, and the interests of justice, 
will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. Further, (E) a 
statement may not be admitted under LR.E. 803(24) unless its proponent gives the 
adverse party adequate notice and information regarding use of the statement. 
State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 697, 760 P.2d 27, 26 (1988). Among these five requirements, the 
district court relied only upon the third in rejecting SIO's argument for the application of Rule 
803(24). Specifically, the district court found that Hart's 3/14/2008 email was not "more 
probative on the point for which it [was] offered than any other evidence which the proponent 
[could] procure through reasonable efforts"104 because of the following finding: 
Both parties involved in this email exchange are available and have filed 
affidavits in support of this motion for summary judgment. Therefore, both of 
their testimonies can be reasonably be procured. Further, this Court concludes 
that their respective personal testimony on this issue is more probative than the 
h ·1 h . 105 earsay e-mai c ams. 
In other words, the district court found that Hart's 3/14/2008 email was not admissible through 
lvfr. Sullivan's testimony under Rule 803(24) because Mr. Hart's testimony was freely available 
with regard to his 3/14/2008 email. 
104 I.R.E. 803(24). 
105 R. Vol. 5, p. 783. 
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We know that Mr. Hart's testimony was freely available because SIO actually submitted 
Mr. Hart's own deposition testimony to the district court for summary judgment purposes. 106 A 
review of the deposition transcript shows that Hart's 3/14/2008 email was marked as Deposition 
Exhibit 24 and that Mr. Hart acknowledged that it was an email chain between himself and Mr. 
Sullivan. 107 
Although SIO submitted a copy of the deposition transcript to the district court for 
summary judgment purposes, SIO did not provide the district court with any of the exhibits to 
Mr. Hart's deposition. Had SIO submitted Deposition Exhibit 24 to the district court with the 
deposition transcript, Hart's 3/14/2008 email would have been admissible for purposes of 
summary judgment because it would have been submitted through Mr. Hart's own testimony 
procured through his deposition. However, SIO chose not to do so and instead chose to offer 
Hart's 3/14/2008 email through Mr. Sullivan's testimony -- thereby making it inadmissible 
hearsay evidence. 
The district court's exclusion of Mr. Sullivan's hearsay testimony concemmg the 
contents of Hart's 3/14/2008 email should be affirmed on appeal. The district court correctly 
found that Rule 803(24) was inapplicable because Mr. Sullivan's hearsay testimony was not 
nearly as probative concerning the contents of Hart's 3/14/2008 email as Mr. Hart's own 
deposition testimony would have been had a copy of Deposition Exhibit 24 been submitted to the 
district court. 
106 See R. Vol. 4, pp. 501-26 (Transcript of Deposition of Mitchell J. Hart). 
107 R. Vol. 4, pp. 514-515 (Tr. p. 52:18 to 53:3). 
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Because the district court correctly concluded that Hart's 3/14/2008 email was fully 
available through an admissible evidentiary source which SIO had for some reason opted not to 
provide on summary judgment, the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Rule 
803(24) was inapplicable and in excluding Mr. Sullivan's hearsay testimony concerning Hart's 
3/14/2008 email for purposes of summary judgment. Therefore, this Court should affirm the 
district court's grant of Monsanto's Motion to Strike with regard to Hart's 3/14/2008 email. 
B. The exclusion of Hart's 3/14/2008 email did not affect a substantial right. 
In addition, the district court did not err in excluding Hart's 3/14/2008 email because its 
exclusion did not affect a substantial right. Idaho Rule of Evidence 103(a) provides that "[e]rror 
may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right 
of the party is affected." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 61 provides that "[t]he court at every 
stage of the proceedings must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not 
affect the substantial rights of the parties." In cases where "a trial court errs in admission or 
exclusion of evidence, we will grant a new trial only if the error affected a substantial right." 
State ex rel. Winder v. Canyon Vista Family Ltd. P'ship, 147 Idaho 718, 726, 228 P.3d 985, 993 
(2010). 
SIO argues that the exclusion of Hart's 3/14/2008 email "prejudices SIO's substantive 
rights" because the email was necessary to prove "the existence of a contract between SIO and 
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Monsanto" and the alleged terms of that contract. 108 SIO's argument is without merit. Exclusion 
of Hart's 3/14/2008 email did not affect SI O's substantial rights because its admission would not 
have altered the district court's findings or conclusion on summary judgment. 
First, SIO argues that Hart's 3/14/2008 email was necessary to prove the existence of an 
alleged verbal agreement with Monsanto. This argument fails because the district court did in 
fact find that "[t]he evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to SIO, establishes that there was 
an oral contract between SIO and Monsanto."109 The email was therefore not necessary for that 
purpose. 
Second, SIO argues that Hart's 3/14/2008 email was necessary to prove the terms of the 
alleged verbal agreement with Monsanto. The alleged terms of the verbal agreement however 
were already in the record before the district court on summary judgment. Those alleged terms 
had been submitted in paragraph 4 of the Affidavit of Todd Sullivan. 110 The district court did not 
strike or exclude that paragraph from the affidavit. 111 The alleged terms of the verbal agreement 
delineated in paragraph 4 of the Affidavit of Todd Sullivan are identical to the alleged terms 
expressed in Hart's 3/14/2008 email. Thus, admission of Hart's 3/14/2008 email would not have 
108 Appellant's Opening Brief at pp. 35-36. SIO specifically argues that the email was necessary 
to show "whether [the verbal agreement] was a mere contract for the sale of goods for $500 or 
more, or whether it was a broader and more unique agreement that involved not the payment for 
goods, but a royalty for sand sold." Id. at 36. By this it is assumed that SIO means that the email 
was necessary to prove the alleged terms of the verbal agreement. 
109 R. Vol. 5, p. 794. 
110 R. Vol. 3, pp. 438-39. 
· 11 1 R. Vol. 5, p. 786. 
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added any new facts to the record which the district court did not already possess and therefore 
would not have changed the district court's analysis. 
It should be pointed out that, because the issue had been placed before the district court in 
the context of a summary judgment motion, the district court was required to accept as true the 
alleged terms of the verbal agreement as delineated in paragraph 4 of the Affidavit of Todd 
Sullivan. See Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 412, 179 P.3d 1064, 1068 
(2008)("For purposes of summary judgment, we must take as true Mackay's allegation that the 
contract was to last 'until retirement."'); Stanley v. Lennox Indus., 140 Idaho 785, 789, 102 P.3d 
1104, 1108 (2004)("It is not proper for the trial judge to assess the credibility of an affiant at the 
summary judgment stage."). SIO has not argued on appeal that the district court failed to accept 
as true for purposes of summary judgment the alleged terms of the verbal agreement as 
delineated in paragraph 4 of the Affidavit of Todd Sullivan. 112 Given that the district court 
already possessed admissible evidence of the alleged terms of the verbal agreement and accepted 
it as true for purposes of summary judgment, admission of Hart's 3114/2008 email would have 
added nothing and would not have altered the district court's analysis. 
A review of the district court's analysis in its Memorandum Decision and Order113 
reveals that the district court accepted SIO's claim that a verbal agreement existed and SIO's 
alleged terms of that agreement. Notwithstanding, the district court concluded that the verbal 
112 In fact, the district court explains in its decision that it fully understood that, on summary 
judgment, it was to accept as true admissible evidence in the record and was prohibited from 
weighing its credibility. R. Vol. 5, pp. 783-86. 
113 Id. at pp. 786-89, 794. 
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agreement was governed by Article 2 of the Idaho Unifo1m Commercial Code and subject to the 
statute of frauds in LC. § 28-2-201(1). The statute of frauds in I.C. § 28-2-201(1) requires a 
writing signed by Monsanto. It is undisputed that Hart's 3/14/2008 email - even if it had been 
admitted - was not signed by Monsanto. Consequently, the statute of frauds would still have 
applied even if Hart's 3/14/2008 email had been admitted. Therefore, admission of the email 
would not have altered the district court's analysis with regard to the statute of frauds. 
In addition, Hart's 3/14/2008 email would not have altered the district court's analysis 
with regard to its dismissal of SIO's causes of action for equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel. 
As discussed above, dismissal of those causes of action was proper because the underlying 
verbal agreement was unenforceable to due vague, indefinite and uncertain terms. Hart's 
3114/2008 email would simply have reinforced the vague, indefinite and uncertain nature of 
those terms instead of clarifying them. Therefore, admission of the email would not have altered 
the analysis for dismissal of SIO's causes of action for equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel. 
Because the admission of Hart's 3/14/2008 email would not have added any facts to the 
record which the district court did not already possess and alternatively because admission of the 
email would not have changed in any respect the district court's analysis or conclusion, this 
Court should reject SIO's claim that exclusion of Hai1's 3/14/2008 email affected its substantial 
rights. 
For the aforementioned reasons, it is therefore respectfully requested that this Court 
affirm the district court's granting of Monsanto's Motion to Strike with regard to Hart's 
3/14/2008 email. 
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VII. MONSANTO IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL. 
Pursuant to LC. § 12-120(3), the prevailing party "in any action to recover in a 
commercial transaction" is entitled to an award of attorney fees. 0 'Shea v. High Mark Dev., 
LLC, 2012 Idaho LEXIS 112, Docket No. 37869 (Idaho Sup. Ct. April 26, 2012). Each of the 
four causes of action asserted by SIO against Monsanto seeks to enforce an alleged verbal 
agreement for the sale of silica sand. This alleged verbal agreement for the sale of silica sand 
constitutes a "commercial transaction" as defined in I. C. § 12-120(3) because it is a transaction 
not "for personal or household purposes." Therefore, it is requested pursuant to LC. § 12-120(3) 
that this Court award attorney fees and costs to Monsanto in the event that it prevails on 
appeal.114 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully requested that this Court affirm the district 
court's grant of summary judgment dismissing all of SI O's causes of action against Monsanto. It 
is also requested that this Court affirm the district comi's grant of Monsanto's Motion to Strike 
with regard to Hart's 3/14/2008 email. Lastly, it is requested that Monsanto be awarded its 
attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
114 SIO does not appeal the district court's award of attorney fees below based upon LC. § 12-
120(3). In addition, SIO does not request attorney fees on appeal and is therefore precluded from 
receiving such an award. See Independence Lead Mines Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 
30, 137 P.3d 409, 416 (2006)(denying fees on appeal because the issue was not raised or argued 
in the briefing). See also I.A.R. 35(a)(5) and I.A.R. 41(a). 
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